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CHAPTER 9
Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia:




Many initiatives have been introduced by both government institu-
tions and civil society organisations (CSOs) to respond to the chal-
lenge of radicalism and violent extremism in Indonesia. The National
Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Teror-
isme‚ BNPT) is the lead agency overseeing initiatives both within and
outside of prisons. As many observers and scholars have identified,
however, BNPT programs tend to be top-down approaches and lack any
ongoing commitment (Sumpter, 2017). By contrast, many CSOs engaged
in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) activities have
concentrated their efforts at either the level of deradicalisation or preven-
tion (Hikam, 2016). But many of these P/CVE programs operated by
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CSOs tend to be fragmented and suffer from a general lack of coordi-
nation within and between CSOs. Given the inherent complexities and
challenges of dealing with radicalism, terrorism and violent extremism, a
comprehensive approach to P/CVE should include a wide range of actors,
including government, CSOs, ulama, families and young people.
This chapter focuses on the role of rehabilitated former terrorists—
‘formers’—within a range of P/CVE programs. BNPT, as well as a
number of CSOs, have begun to trial the involvement of former terrorists
in their P/CVE programs. Up until now, however, it has been very diffi-
cult to obtain a clear overview of what has, and is, being done. Based on
my research, there are several types of initiatives in which former terror-
ists have been involved, including prison-based programs, youth programs
and economic empowerment programs. By identifying these three cate-
gories, this chapter explores the extent to which these CSOs have involved
former terrorists within their P/CVE programs, what the programs of
each of the CSOs actually involve with respect to the participation of
formers, and what initiatives are the most effective among each of these
efforts.
When P/CVE initiatives first commenced in Indonesia in the late
2000s, the field was sparsely documented and poorly understood. Since
2015, however, some very significant and innovative research has been
conducted on the issue of counter terrorism and P/CVE in Indonesia.
Chernov-Hwang (2015), for example, has focused on the pathways
of disengagement for Indonesian jihadists, especially those from the
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Mujahidin KOMPAK (a Poso-based JI affil-
iate) networks. Ian Chalmers (2017) has explored the experiences of
disengaged and deradicalised jihadists after being treated during or
after their time in jail. Based on his research, Chalmers offers a policy
regarding which programs are most effective for dealing with jihadists.
And Cameron Sumpter (2017), has provided a comprehensive overview
of the various P/CVE programs and initiatives conducted by CSOs to fill
the gaps left by government bodies. Using the work of Hwang, Chalmers
and Sumpter as a starting point, this chapter will focus specifically on the
role of former jihadists in P/CVE programs.
In order to establish a comprehensive understanding of these themes,
I have combined library research, participatory observation and inter-
views in order to build up a more complete picture. Analysis of the
existing literature in this field provides a foundational background for
this article, while my own involvement in and observation of, several of
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these P/CVE initiatives provides additional insights. Finally, I have also
conducted online and on-site interviews with both former terrorists them-
selves and the caretakers of the CSOs dealing with former terrorists. It
is hoped that this chapter may enrich and enlighten the existing under-
standing of many government bodies and policymakers on the various
approaches to P/CVE in Indonesia.
De-radicalisation as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy
In Indonesia, the growth of ultra-conservative ideologies in a political
and social context of democratic contestation has created a hot house
for radicalisation into hateful and violent extremism. In the 1950s, the
home-grown radical Islamist group Negara Islam Indonesia (Darul Islam,
NII) gave rise to several generations of close-knit extremists. This led
ultimately to the formation of a new spin-off group Jemaah Islamiyah, in
1993 in part as a result of the experiences of Darul Islam mujahideen in
the 1978–1992 Afghanistan war. It was formed by two prominent Darul
Islam activists, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baashir, who had gone
into exile (hijrah) in Malaysia in the mid-1980s and then led a group of
several hundred self-proclaimed mujahideen to al-Qaeda training camps
in Afghanistan from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
A number of other groups have since emerged in Indonesia, including
Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), established in 2008, and Jamaah
Anshorut Daulah (JAD), formed in 2015, both of which have declared
their support for the Islamic State (IS) movement in Syria and Iraq. The
emergence of these groups indicates that violent extremism has estab-
lished a strong presence in Indonesia. There have been many violent
incidences or acts of terrorism that have occurred in the country since the
turn of the century, conducted by both JI and JAD. While JI has since
renounced its previous policy of violent and deadly attacks in Indonesia as
a ‘mistake’, JAD and JAT continue to openly support violence. Support
for JAT and JAD has continued to grow in Indonesia, especially among
the youth population.
As the radical ideology of these groups continues to gain traction,
Indonesians and especially Indonesian authorities, have a lot of work to do
to combat this threat. Since the authorities, and in particular the specialist
anti-terrorism squad, Densus 88 (Special Detachment 88), have weak-
ened the structure of JI and arrested many of its key members, JAT and
JAD have emerged as a new threat, particularly since the establishment
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of the Islamic State in Syria. The narrative surrounding the Islamic State
caliphate in Iraq and Syria has inspired many Indonesians to not only
become a part of the jihad in Syria, but to also wage jihad at home. In
addition to the Indonesians who made the journey to join IS in Syria,
many others engaged in small-scale attacks at home in the name of JAD.
These include the Sarinah bombings in (2016), Kampung Melayu bomb-
ings in 2017, Mako Brimob riots in 2018 and Surabaya bombings in
2018. Clearly violent extremism and groups such as JI, JAT and JAD
constitute an enduring threat in Indonesia. The threat might be contained
but there is no realistic hope of it being eliminated.
Many attempts have been made to counter terrorism by both govern-
mental bodies and CSOs. At the governmental level, the Indonesian
government has issued Anti-Terrorism Law (2003), established the anti-
terrorism squad, Special Detachment 88 (2003) and in 2010 it established
BNPT, the National Body for Combating Terrorism. In 2018, the Anti-
Terrorism Law was revised to accommodate for input from multiple
elements of society and to address recent developments in the terrorism
space. In order to reach multiple regions, BNPT has created a support
body, the Coordination Forum for Preventing Terrorism, or Forum
Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme (FKPT), at every provincial level.
Normatively, FKPT should work hand-in-hand with local CSOs to iden-
tify the vulnerabilities in their respective areas and prevent people from
becoming involved in violent extremism.
As there is no single factor that accounts for radicalism and terrorism,
there is no one-size-fits-all approach to dealing with these threats. Many
efforts have been made to counter radicalism and terrorism, including
both hard and soft approaches. While law enforcement authorities tend
to employ hard approaches to apprehend individuals involved in radi-
calism and terrorism, many government bodies and CSOs work together
to counter and prevent radicalism through soft approaches targeting issue
areas such as ideology, economics, culture, etc. These approaches recog-
nise that a comprehensive, diverse approach is required as radicalism is
driven by a range of different pull and push factors.
In relation to counter-terrorism programs, the government tends to
employ the concept of ‘deradicalization’ (deradikalisasi). Although the
types of programs within this concept are relatively broad, the usage of
this term is somewhat misleading. Deradicalisation refers to disengaging
radicalised individuals from violent extremism; however, government
bodies tend to use this term for a broad range of programs, including
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those that focus on preventing people from becoming extremists or radi-
cals. This loose usage of the term ‘derad’ is not widely accepted, however,
outside of government bodies, and it has faced criticism from both the
public as well as from CSOs that include non-radicals in their deradicalisa-
tion programs. For example, Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second biggest
Muslim organisation, refuses to be involved in government projects on
deradicalisation as it is felt that it poses a significant risk of causing
tension between the organisation and the society with which it works
(Haedar, 2016). This resistance from society towards deradicalisation is
understood by many CSOs. As such, they tend to use different terms
to name their programs, such as mainstreaming moderate Islam, coun-
tering violent extremism and religious moderation (moderasi beragama).
In contrast, in line with the new terrorism laws, the government continues
to use and define deradicalisation as “a planned, integrated, systematic
and continuous process carried out to eliminate or reduce and reverse the
radical understanding of Terrorism that has taken place”.
Terrorism and Prisoners in Indonesia
The Soufan Center (2017) has recorded that, of the more than 600 (as
of 2017) Indonesian jihadists that travelled to Syria, about 384 of them
are still in Syria and only about 50 have returned to Indonesia. The data
also records that approximately 435 people have been stopped in Turkey
and deported back to Indonesia (Barret, 2017). Meanwhile, BNPT esti-
mates from 2017 indicate that about 1,000 Indonesians travelled to Syria
and of those, some 200 of them have returned (Mengapa Suriah Menjadi
Tujuan 2017). More recent reports indicate that there are 689, or so,
former Indonesian supporters and fighters of IS in Syria that may return
to Indonesia (Adyatama, 2020). Although the number of Indonesians
making the journey to Syria began to decrease in line with the signifi-
cant losses suffered by IS, the number of foreign fighters returning to
Indonesia will likely increase as a result, posing an additional threat to
the country. In line with this issue, Sidney Jones warned some years ago,
in the wake of the declaration of the ISIS caliphate, that “the overall
capacity of Indonesian extremists remains low, but their commitment
to ISIS could prove deadly” (Pitaloka, 2014). In terms of both home-
grown and foreign terrorists, as of late 2018 there were approximately
302 inmates spread across 111 prisons throughout some 26 provinces
across Indonesia. In addition, there were 152 detainees who have not yet
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been charged (inkracht ) (taken from H. Fikri, personal communication,
September 5, 2018).
During a visit to terrorist inmates in Palu prison in February 2018,
repentant former militant Nasir Abas observed that terrorists from Java
and outer Java differ in many important aspects. While terrorists from
Java are normally more ideologically driven, those from outer Java, such as
from Sulawesi, tend to be less ideologically driven. My conversations and
discussions with terrorists in Palu’s first-class prison confirms the assertion
that most inmates became involved in violent extremism, taking up the
methods of terrorism out of desperation, due to their disappointment
with the government, and in particular the government’s policies that
they believed to have mostly marginalised Muslims.
Many former terrorist prisoners have not been successfully disengaged
from terrorist networks and the use of violence. The director of BNPT,
Suhardi Alius, stated in early 2018 that among the 630 ex-prisoners of
terrorism, only 325 of them have followed a deradicalisation program
and about 128 of them have willingly helped the BNPT with the program
(Dari 360 eksnapiter, 2018). Taufiq Andrie of the Institute for Interna-
tional Peace Building (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian; YPP) has reported
that YPP is aware of many ex-terrorists who have returned to violent
extremism upon release (Andrie, 2012). Indeed, Alius also admits that
many ex-terrorist prisoners have gone on to be involved again in violent
activity (600 Napi Kasus Terorisme 2018). However, he has urged society
as a whole to take part in the reintegration process of the ex-prisoners,
especially in an economic sense, in order to help prevent these individuals
from returning to violent extremist groups.
This is not to say that deradicalisation programs in prisons have
completely failed to achieve their desired outcomes. Among the 302
terrorist inmates in 2018, Husnal Fikri reported that 46 inmates had
been successfully disengaged from terrorism and accepted the political
legitimacy of the Indonesian Republic, reversing their previous stance
of radical opposition (taken from H. Fikri, personal communication,
September 5, 2018). To be truly effective, however, P/CVE requires
broad, ongoing, support from across the whole of society. This is crit-
ically important to both the successful disengagement of the prisoners
and ex-prisoners from their groups and to limiting the creeping influence
of ultra-conservative/reactionary ideology that incites hate and violence.
Within this whole of society approach, there is an integral role for former
terrorists to play in the disengagement process.
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The table below summarises a range of efforts by CSOs to establish
prison-based, youth-based and economic empowerment-based P/CVE
programs using former terrorists. The discussion that follows in the
remainder of this chapter examines each of these programs in detail,
giving particular attention to how they have incorporated former terrorists
into their P/CVE programs.
Youth-Based Programs
Institute for International Peace
Building/Yayasan Prasasti Perdamain
(YPP)
• Films ‘Jihad Selfie’ (2015)‚ ‘Pengantin’
(2017) and ‘Seeking the Imam (2020)
as counter narrative.
• Documentaries using formers/youth
who have been drawn to VE groups
• Screened in towns, senior high schools
and universities
• Q&A with formers




• Programs incorporate formers and
victims of terrorism
• Aims to raise awareness and empathy
Ruangobrol.id • Website-base programs
• Employs disengaged terrorists and
returnees as ‘credible voices’
Center for the Study of Islam and Social
Transformation
(CISForm)
• University research centre
• Employs cartoons in counter-narrative
initiatives
• Distributed across social media:
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter.
• Launched by former returned from
Syria
Kalijaga Institute for Justice
(KIJ)
• School-based program
• Former returned from Syria involved
to present counter narrative
Prison-Based Programs
The Research Centre for Police
Studies/Pusat Riset Ilmu Kepolisian
(PRIK)
• University-based organisation
• Incorporates formers and religious
scholars










• Incorporates formers, religious
scholars, psychologists, spouses and
entrepreneurs
• Applied science approach
Institute for International Peace
Building/Yayasan Prasasti Perdamain
(YPP)
• Program without formers
Economic Empowerment Programs
Institute for International Peace
Building/Yayasan Prasasti Perdamain
(YPP)
• Employs entrepreneur training
• Option to start own small enterprise
or become involved in existing YPP
business





• Economic empowerment through
employment and training opportunities
• Provides safe space to discuss religious
and ideological issues
• Provides practical support to those
disassociating from former VE
networks
• Founded and run by former previously
involved in JI
Prison-Based Initiatives
There are several CSOs that run programs with inmates convicted of
terrorism. These include the Institute for International Peace Building
(Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian, YPP), established by Noor Huda Ismail,
the Research Centre for Police Studies (Pusat RisetIlmu Kepolisian,
PRIK), and the Division for Applied Social Psychology Research
(DASPR) Daya Makara of the University of Indonesia (UI). The first of
these CSOs is a private organisation, while the other two are university-
based organisations/research centers. Although each of these three CSOs
have prison-based programmes for terrorist inmates, they each differ in
their approaches. For example, the prison-based programs of YPP do not
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incorporate former terrorists. PRIK and DASPR on the other hand both
involve former terrorists in their prison-based programs, drawing on the
expertise and experiences of these individuals.
Since 2009, PRIK has been working with prisoners and individuals
on parole who have been charged with terrorism offences. PRIK is
a university-based centre founded by well-known psychologist Sarlito
Wirawan, and it aims to change individual mindsets through several
programmes, some of which involve religious scholars. PRIK has also
incorporated former JI member, Nasir Abas, into their program as an
expert on radicalism. Recognising that shifting the ideology of the
terrorist inmates requires a multi-faceted approach, PRIK’s programs
address not only political and religious issues, but also social issues such
as family, social welfare, governance and daily life in prison. Up until
2016, PRIK worked with roughly 150 individuals, some of whom may
still be serving their prison sentences (Sumpter, 2017). Following the
death of Sarlito Wirawan, some PRIK members from the Faculty of
Psychology, as well as Nasir Abas, detached themselves from PRIK and
in 2017 establish a new centre; DASPR at the University of Indonesia.
Some of their work on the spouses of terrorists is covered in Chapter
Seven of this volume. Although PRIK and DASPR share a number
of commonalities, particularly their ‘In Prison Re-education Program’
(IPRP) strategy, some members of DASPR view their research centre as
having an applied science approach, whereas PRIK focuses more closely
on a security approach.
Based on DASPR’s 8-month research project across a number of
prisons, it found that:
1. it was unclear with whom the responsibility for designing and
implementing deradicalisation programs in prisons rested, whether
it was with BNPT or with the Directorate General of Correction
(DGC); and.
2. to date, there is little coordination among CSOs when dealing
with terrorist inmates (Convey Indonesia 2018). Consequently,
many programs dealing with terrorist inmates tend to overlap with
one another and miss the opportunity to build synergies.
At one end of the spectrum, the program conducted by BNPT focuses
primarily on ideological aspects and does not deal with economic or
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psychological issues. DASPR, on the other hand, finds that disengage-
ment programs in prisons should be more comprehensive and should
involve the inmates’ spouses as well as psychologists.
In light of these findings, in 2018, DASPR commenced its third IPRP
which included psychologists, religious scholars and entrepreneurs, as
well as the inmates’ spouses (taken from F. Erikha, personal communi-
cation, September 25, 2018). While terrorist inmates work directly with
the religious scholars and entrepreneurs, the terrorists’ wives interact with
the program’s psychologists. In 2018, DASPR worked with roughly 22
inmates in 5 selected prisons: Cianjur, Cirebon, Karawang, Lamongan and
Palu. DASPR teams visited the prisons each month with different team
members.
Nasir Abas has served as the central figure involved in the P/CVE
programs for inmates conducted by PRIK and DASPR. Abas, originally
from Malaysia, became a naturalised Indonesian citizen in 2017. In 1986,
Abas joined Darul Islam/NII when he was studying at Ma’had Ittiba As-
Sunnah in Selangor, Malaysia, which later brought him to study at the
Military Academy of Harbiy Pohantun at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border
from 1987 to 1993. After the formation of JI and the split with Darul
Islam/NII in 1993, Abas went on to serve as the head of Mantiqi III, a JI
division covering the Eastern part of Indonesia and the Philippines, and
also established Hudaibiyah Camp in Mindanao to assist the mujahidin
in the southern part of the Philippines. Although he was never involved
in any violent activity in Indonesia, Abas was arrested by the authorities
in relation to document falsification and possession of a gun. At the time,
he says, he was already beginning to have doubts about the extremist
violence promoted by some activists in the network. For Abas, the violent
extremism of some JI members in early 2000 was not in line with the
manhaj (platform) of the organisation. Following his arrest, Abas has
assisted Indonesian authorities, writing a book in the process (2005) and
has been involved in many P/CVE programs. His experience during his
time involved with JI has assisted DASPR to run programs specifically in
the areas of Palu and Poso, which were previously part of Abas’ Mantiqi
III area of operation (taken from F. Erikha, personal communication,
September 25, 2018).
The DASPR inmates programme has been deliberately designed to
serve not only as a treatment per se, but also as a quantitative research
project. This research project aims to examine the effectiveness of the
program and seeks to determine the most effective type of program for
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terrorist inmates. DASPR’s research acknowledges that running effective
deradicalisation programs in prisons is no easy task. As it deals with high-
risk terrorists, the program needs to involve a range of stakeholders, such
as BNPT, DGC and Densus 88. When visiting prisons, the IPRP program
should involve not only the above representatives, but also psycholo-
gists, entrepreneurs and religious experts. The greatest challenge for this
program, however, is the inmates themselves, as many of them may be
reluctant to cooperate during the intervention (taken from F. Erikha,
personal communication, September 25, 2018).
Youth-Based Initiatives
Youth have been found to be among the most susceptible to the influ-
ence of extremism ideology. As such, many CSOs have designed programs
specifically for a youth audience, and of those, a number have involved
participation from former terrorists. Key CSOs engaging in youth-based
programs incorporating formers include Aliansi Indonesia Damai (AIDA),
Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP), Ruangobrol.id‚ the Centre for the
Study of Islam and Social Transformation (CISForm), and Kalijaga
Institute for Justice (KIJ).
Since 2013, AIDA has run a broad program focusing on spreading
its peaceful campaign in dozens of schools in many vulnerable areas
throughout Jawa, Sumatera, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Maluku, & Sulawesi
Tengah (A. Subkhi, personal communication, September 24, 2018).
From 2018, AIDA’s targeted schools have become narrower in scope,
focusing particularly on schools in Serang, Solo and Bima, where some
students have already become involved in violent extremism (taken from
A. Kustiadi, personal communication, September 18, 2018). To deepen
the emotional impact of its program, AIDA involves both victims of
terrorism and former terrorists, allowing each to speak about their
experiences. In these sessions, victims speak about their journey and
how they have come to forgive those responsible for the attacks, while
former terrorists discuss their experiences and how they have transitioned
away from violent extremism. The aim of the program is not only to
raise students’ awareness of the dangers of violent extremism, but also
to promote empathy towards the victims of terrorism, and to remind
students that, at its heart Islam’s central message is to be ‘show mercy
to all creation’ (rahmatanlil’alamin).
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Two of the key former terrorists involved in the AIDA team are Kurnia
Widodo and Ali Fauzi Manji. Widodo had previously been involved in
NII since 1991, when he was still a student at senior high school. His
involvement in radical groups intensified during his time as a student at
Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). Following Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,
Widodo was involved in Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and JAT.
In 2010, he was captured by the authorities for his involvement in the
Cibiru group plot to bomb several places and for his involvement in mili-
tary training in Aceh. Released in 2014, Widodo acknowledged that he
had learned a great deal about culture, humanity and peaceful Islam from
several ustadzs in prisons (Widodo, 2017). Having made this transfor-
mation, Widodo says that he is now very glad to be involved in many
AIDA peaceful campaigns and to be a part of the AIDA peace team.
Widodo’s contribution to the youth programs run by AIDA offers a very
good opportunity for raising awareness and empathy among the youth
(Widodo, 2017).
YPP also focuses on the youth and their vulnerability to the influence of
radical ideology. Among YPP’s efforts targeting the youth population are
Noor Huda Ismail’s documentary films ‘Jihad Selfie’ (2015)‚ ‘Pengantin’
(2017)‚ and ‘Seeking the Imam’ (2020). These documentaries are based
on the experiences of youths who had been drawn in by ultra-conservative
ideology. These films were screened in many towns, universities and senior
high schools across Indonesia and even gained attention in other coun-
tries. Following the screenings, Ismail (2015) would offer a discussion
session featuring a former member of an extremist group. Often, Mach-
mudi Hariono, a former JI member, would be present at these screenings
and would be asked to share his experiences during his involvement in JI.
Although never directly involved in violent activity in Indonesia, Mach-
mudi Hariono (aka. Yusuf) held fast to violent extremist views. Yusuf
studied Islam with Bali bombers Muchlas and Amrozi at the Pesantren of
Al-Islam in Lamongan in 1995, where he was recruited as a JI member. In
2000, Yusuf was sent to join a Muslim militia in Mindanao and, during
this time, gained significant experience in war strategies and weaponry
techniques. Upon his return to Indonesia in 2002, Yusuf continued
his involvement with JI under the leadership of Abu Tholut. In 2004,
Yusuf, along with Abu Tholut, was arrested by the Indonesian authorities
for hiding explosives and thousands of ammunitions. During his five-
year prison term, Yusuf reflected at length upon his life and previously
unquestioned convictions and came to regret his extremist activities and
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involvement with radical movements (taken from M. Hariono, personal
communication, September 29, 2018). His interactions with Noor Huda
of YPP led Yusuf to become an entrepreneur. Yusuf now works as a private
taxi driver and is actively involved with many CSO-run P/CVE programs
as a speaker. His testimonies during the screening of YPP movies have
contributed significantly to the aims of the movies as counter narratives
for youth. Ruangobrol.id greatly contributes to counter the spread of
extremism ideology among the youths. As understood that extremists
make use of technology especially internet and social media to spread their
ideologies; many youths are also attracted and involved in some violent
extremism due to the propaganda of extremists through social media. To
reduce the backlash from the target audience, Noor Huda Ismail and the
late of his brother Rosyid Nurul Hakim established Ruangobrol.id. To
strengthen its voices, Ruangobrol.id employs some disengaged terrorists
and returnees to participate in the web-based platform. The experiences of
the reformed terrorists and returnees made them as the ‘credible voices’
to counter the propaganda of the extremists. Mahmudi Hariono (aka.
Yusuf), the former JI member, and Joko Trihermanto (aka. Jack Harun),
the former right-hand man of the late Noordin M Top, a Malaysian JI
member, are among the first ‘credible voices’ of Ruangobrol. Currently,
many other disengaged terrorists or returnees have joined the forum,
whereas Arif Budi Setyawan (aka. Arif Tuban) as the most prolific writer
in Ruangobrol.id. Since 2018, Arif has wrote about 394 short essays in
Ruangobrol as his reflections on his previous experiences or some current
phenomena on the issue of (violent) extremism either in Indonesia or
abroad (taken from Arif B. Setiawan, personal communication, August
28, 2021). Based on an analysis by the end of 2020, about 30% of the
readers of Ruangobrol are youths (18-34 old range). To broaden its scope
of readers, Ruangobrol is promoted in many platforms of social media
such as facebook, twitter, and instragram.
I am personally involved with another university-based program
involving former terrorists is CISForm, a research centre at the State
Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Kalijaga, in Yogyakarta, with a focus on
research and publishing. In the last several years however, CISForm has
shifted its program to focus on youth as the most vulnerable population
at risk of becoming influenced by radical ideology. In promoting counter
narratives to the hateful narratives associated with the ultra-conservative
ideology of groups like ISIS, CISForm developed a series of 40 cartoons
on several contemporary subjects within Islam, including jihâd, hijrah,
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khilâfah and tolerant Islam. The cartoons have been disseminated widely
via key social media platforms, such as Youtube, Facebook and Twitter. To
strengthen its influence among the youth, CISForm invited Nurshadrina
Khaira Dhania, a returnee from Syria, to launch the cartoon in Jakarta.
Dhania has played a significant role in the CIS Form program by offering
the audience her experiences as contextualisation for the subject matter
of the cartoons.
Another CSO engaged in P/CVE, KIJ‚ also works on youth, with a
particular focus on school students in the Klaten region (a sprawling low-
rise city 30 kms east of Yogyakarta). As KIJ is a relatively new research
centre at UIN Sunan Kalijaga, this is the first P/CVE initiative it has
conducted. This initiative is not just a youth outreach program, it is also
a research initiative which aims to produce P/CVE policy papers in order
to contribute to the broader policy discussion surrounding P/CVE initia-
tives. Similar to CISForm, KIJ’s P/CVE initiative is conducted in four
schools in Klaten, two of them private schools and two public schools,
and it also involves Nurshadrina Khaira Dhania as a significant voice
contributing to their program.
The experience of Dhania living in Syria offers a very significant
counter narrative to the ultra-conservative and utopian ideology of IS,
which threatens to spread unchallenged among the local youth. Dhania
recounts being deceived by IS propaganda and the caliphate of Islam.
When she was in her second year of senior high school in Jakarta, she
went to Syria along with 17 members of her family, lured by the utopian
promise of the Caliphate, including the provision of welfare promised
under the banner of IS. After having lived in several locations in IS-
occupied northern Syria, Dhania’s family found the promises of the
Islamic State’s online propaganda campaign of an Islamic utopia to be
completely at odds with the lived reality of the Caliphate. During her first
year, living in a female dormitory, Dhania saw that women were treated
as sexual slaves for the male jihadists. Disappointed with the reality of
life under IS, Dhania and her family tried to escape from the captivity
of IS and, after almost another year, were eventually able to return to
Indonesia. Upon their return in August 2017, Dhania and her family
came to view Indonesia as much more Islamic in many aspects when
compared to the Islamic State caliphate from which they had returned.
The narrative presented through Dhania’s personal experiences living
under IS offers a very important lesson for pupils to be more critical
of the deceptive, romanticised narratives and distorted understandings of
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Islam pushed by extremist groups (taken from N. K. Dhania, personal
communication, April 18, 2018).
Dhania and her family are but one example of Indonesian youths and
families drawn to the illusive hope of an Islamic caliphate. This is unsur-
prising in light of IS’s extensive use of the internet and social media to
spread its propaganda. Testimonies such as Dhania’s are needed to show
young people that the reality behind IS’s promises is quite different,
and that they need to be more critical of the media they are exposed
to. Providing a platform for former terrorists and returnees to share
their experiences has the potential to have a significant impact on youth
decision-making in response to extremist ideologies and the messaging of
terrorist groups.
Economic Empowerment
for Former Terrorist Prisoners
Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP) and Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian
(YLP), are pioneering CSOs leading the way among the very few
CSOs that offer economic empowerment programs working with former
terrorist prisoners. As one of the leading CSOs on P/CVE, YPP’s
economic empowerment program targets the hearts and minds of the
ex-terrorists by supporting their need for economic independence. YPP
organises entrepreneur training and then allows prisoners to choose to
start either their own small enterprise or become involved in a business
set by YPP. One of the most successful economic empowerment avenues
for former terrorists to emerge out of the YPP program is Dapoer Bistik
Solo (DBS). Widodo Kainan (32) the main chef, is proud of the fact that
there have been many former terrorist prisoners involved in running DBS,
working in a range of roles such as cashiers, purchasers and in marketing.
In addition to this, Kainan notes that DBS management is also involved
in organising religious meetings and discussions to support prisoners in
their disengagement from their previous radical networks. Furthermore,
Kainan argues that YPP’s economic empowerment program would not
only lead to economic independence, but also to ideological indepen-
dence (Kainan, personal communication, August 28, 2018). The founder
of YPP, Noor Huda Ismail, has stated that DBS now plays more of a role
as a meeting point and a public space for many former terrorists in Solo
and its surrounding areas (Ismail, personal communication, September
30, 2018).
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Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (YLP) has also opted for an economic
empowerment approach in its programs aimed at former terrorists. In
contrast to the vast majority of CSOs, which are primarily based in
Jakarta, YLP was founded in 2017 by Ali Fauzi Manji in Lamongan,
East Java. Lamongan and its surrounding areas are home to many ex-
terrorist convicts from the JI and JAD networks. As a former terrorist
himself, Fauzi has the support of a number of his friends, many of
whom are also ex-terrorist convicts. The prime objective of YLP’s work
in Lamongan is to improve the circumstances of former terrorists by
empowering them economically and assisting their disassociation from
their former networks. In this endeavour, YLP has the support of many of
its stakeholders, including the police force in the Lamongan region and
the Director of BNPT, Suhardi Alius. Although Fauzi’s program has been
ridiculed by current JI and JAD members, he has continued to progress
forward and is currently trying to gain as many board members as possible
to support the existence and the sustainability of the foundation.
As the brother of Bali bombers Muchlas and Amrozi, Ali Fauzi Manzi
(47) was also involved in JI activity. After training at JI’s Hudaibiyah
Camp at Mindanao in 1994, Fauzi developed skills in military strategy
and weaponry techniques. During the Ambon and Poso social conflicts,
he was appointed as the head instructor of military training of Nusantara
militia. After the conflicts, Fauzi travelled back to a Moro Islamic Liber-
ation Front (MILF) military camp in Mindanao where he was eventually
caught by the Philippines authorities in 2004. Deported to Indonesia
in very poor health in 2006, Fauzi received extensive medical treat-
ment and remained in the custody of Indonesian authorities until, after
a complete change of heart, he turned his back on his previous life and
disengaged from his violent extremist connections. Since then, Fauzi has
been involved in many government and CSO-based P/CVE programs
and initiatives. His involvement in the P/CVE initiatives also brought
him to meet many victims of terrorism among whom were the fami-
lies of the victim of the 2002 Bali bombings. The meetings with the
victims or and their families reinforced his decision to establish Yayasan
LingkarPerdamaian (YLP).
Based in Yogyakarta, Muhammad In’am (42), serves as one of the
board members of YLP. A native of Lamongan, In’am is the head of
accompaniment and empowerment of ex-terrorist convicts for YLP. In’am
himself was never a terrorist, but his younger brother died carrying out a
suicide bombing in Aleppo, Syria in 2014 and many of his counterparts
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from Lamongan were also involved in violent attacks. These close personal
connections with violent extremism motivated In’am to become involved
in combatting violent extremism. In Yogyakarta, In’am established Café
Gandroeng. Although not initially established with this purpose clearly
in mind, In’am has since dedicated his café to creating opportunities for
ex-terrorist convicts as part of a broader disengagement program.
Surrounded by many universities, Café Gandroeng is well known
among students in the eastern part of the city. Ahmad Azhar (26) and
Salman Alfaluty (33) are among some ex-terrorist convicts working at the
café. After spending some years in prisons due to their involvement in
violent extremism, Azhar and Alfaluty came to regret their actions and
detached themselves from their respective radical groups, NII and JAD.
Azhar and Alfaluty have said that they feel lucky to be accepted at In’am’s
café. At the time of our interview, Alfaluty has been at the Gandroeng
café for approximately 5 months, while Azhar had been there for only
2 months. In addition to teaching them how to brew coffee and run a
café, they said that In’am would often discuss with them religious matters,
especially with regard to ideological aspects. Alfaluty confessed, however,
that he continues to view the caliphate in a favourable light (taken from
A. Azhar and S. Alfaluty, personal communication, August 24, 2018).
In addition to providing personal and intensive ‘training’ to ex-terrorist
convicts like Alfaluty and Azhar, Muhammad In’am has organised several
entrepreneurship workshops for ex-terrorist convicts in his café as part
of his involvement with YLP Lamongan. His expertise and dedication
to countering terrorism is well known by BNPT, and has resulted in
In’am being invited by BNPT to present on entrepreneurship for pre-
released inmates. For In’am, Gandroeng offers a very good opportunity
for ex-terrorist prisoners to start their new lives through training them to
interact with a wide range of people and offering them practical skills.
Conclusion
As recruitment by extremist groups and the creeping spread of extremist
ideology continue to present insidious challenges in Indonesia, coun-
tering violent extremism (CVE) cannot be seen as just a task for
government bodies; rather, civil society must also be involved. Generally
speaking, government bodies alone cannot address the broad scope and
diversity of challenges presented by radicalism and terrorism. Indeed, even
BNPT and DGC, the most authoritative bodies involved in conducting
P/CVE programs within prisons, still struggle to coordinate these
programs alone due to the overcrowding of prisons and the mobility of
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the prisoners. Among the few CSOs dealing with terrorist convicts in
prison, PRIK and DASPR at the University of Indonesia research centre
play an important role in addressing the challenge of violent extremism.
While it is difficult to determine to what extent the initiatives in prisons
have been successful, there is a good reason for believing that the involve-
ment of former terrorists in the programs could increase the potential
for successful outcomes. Although both PRIK and DASPR have included
religious scholars, psychologists and entrepreneurs, the limited frequency
of their visits still hinders the effectiveness of the program. This suggests
that the in-prison programs could benefit significantly from an addi-
tional support from prison wardens (pamong), given the consistently close
proximity or wardens to the prisoners on a day-to-day basis.
So far, P/CVE initiatives involving former terrorists out of the prison
system appear to have been reasonably successful. But as government
bodies do not work directly with ex-terrorist prisoners in these types
of programs, this field of work has been the domain of CSOs. The key
among these CSOs are YPP and YLP. To disengage ex-terrorist prisoners
from their previous networks, both YPP and YLP are trying to appeal to
these prisoners by organising entrepreneurship workshops and providing
venture capital to set up their own small-scale enterprise. Although these
initiatives are not able to be large-scale operations, their approach appears
to be more feasible and has demonstrated clearer signs of success.
The last, and perhaps the most successful element of these initiatives,
has been the involvement of former terrorists in youth programs. Young
people have been found to be the most vulnerable section of society in
relation to their susceptibility to radical ideology. AIDA’s program of
peaceful campaign is already being conducted with teenagers in a number
of schools across many areas in Indonesia that have been identified as
particularly at risk. Such programs can be relatively easily adopted by many
other CSOs, as has already been demonstrated by the effective work of
Ruangobrol.id, KIJ and CISForm.
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